Upjohn Institute Working Papers

Upjohn Research home page

7-1-2006

Retiree Health Benefits and Retirement
James Marton
University of Kentucky

Stephen A. Woodbury
Michigan State University and W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, woodbury@upjohn.org

Upjohn Institute Working Paper No. 06-128
**Published Version**
In

Government Spending on the Elderly, edited by Dimitri B. Papadimitriou. New York:

Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, pp. 220-241;

Public Finance Review 41(1): 64-91

Follow this and additional works at: https://research.upjohn.org/up_workingpapers
Part of the Health Economics Commons

Citation
Marton, James and Stephen A. Woodbury. 2006. "Retiree Health Benefits and Retirement." Upjohn
Institute Working Paper No. 06-128. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
https://doi.org/10.17848/wp06-128

This title is brought to you by the Upjohn Institute. For more information, please contact repository@upjohn.org.

Retiree Health Benefits and Retirement

Upjohn Institute Staff Working Paper 06-128

James Marton and Stephen A. Woodbury
Revised, July 2006

Abstract
Employer-provided health benefit coverage for workers who retire before age 65 has
fallen over the last decade. We examine a cohort of male workers from the Health and
Retirement Survey to examine questions about the dynamics of retiree health benefits and
the relationship between retiree health benefits and retirement behavior, which is
important for the debate over increasing health coverage for older Americans without
reducing work incentives. On dynamics, we find that between 1992 and 1996, 24 percent
of full-time workers who had retiree health benefits lost their coverage, while 15 percent
of full-time workers who lacked coverage gained it. Also, of the full-time employed men
who were covered by retiree health benefits in 1992 and had retired by 1996, 3 percent
were uninsured, and 15 percent were covered by health insurance other than employerprovided insurance. On the relationship between retiree health benefits and retirement,
we find that workers with retiree benefits were 29 to 55 percent more likely to retire than
those without. We also find that workers who are eligible for retiree health benefits tend
to take advantage of them when they are relatively young.
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Retiree Health Benefit Coverage and Retirement
Labor markets and health insurance are closely linked in the United States
because many employers provide health insurance to both current and retired workers.
Economists and policy analysts have paid much attention to the reasons for and
consequences of employer provision of health insurance to current employees — see, for
example, Rosen (2000) for a review and discussion — but retiree health benefits have
received far less attention, at least in part because data on them have been scarce.
Nevertheless, retiree health benefits raise important issues for public policy.
Offers of employer-provided retiree benefits — especially offers to early retirees — have
become less common in recent years (see section 1).1 By definition, early retirees are not
yet eligible for Medicare and may not be able to afford private coverage. Moreover, their
expected health care expenses are larger than those of younger workers. If society values
the consumption of health care coverage by early retirees, employer-provided retiree
coverage is likely to be a public policy concern.
Any number of public policies could increase the health insurance coverage of
early retirees. For example, Medicare could be extended to early retirees, or new
incentives could be created (or mandates adopted) for employers to offer additional
retiree health coverage. However, given the link between health markets and the labor
market, such policies could have the unintended consequence of increasing the incentive
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Because most retirees are eligible for Medicare at age 65, employer-provided retiree health benefits are of
two kinds — first, coverage for early retirees (those younger than 65), which often continues the health
insurance a worker had while employed until age 65; second, coverage for the Medicare eligible (those 65
or older), which supplements Medicare so that retirees have comprehensive health insurance. Alternatives
to employer-provided retiree health benefits do exist, but they are usually more expensive or less generous
than employer-provided health insurance. For example, early retirees may buy private health insurance, and
retirees age 65 and older may buy Medigap insurance or enroll in Medicare Advantage (Medicare, Part C, a
private plan administered through Medicare).
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to retire early in order to take advantage of the expanded health coverage. The extent to
which this is a problem depends on the strength of the relationship between the
availability of retiree health benefits and labor supply (in this case, retirement).
Our main goal in this paper is to add to the evidence on the effects of retiree
health benefits on retirement. We do this by examining data from the Health and
Retirement Study (HRS), a major longitudinal survey sponsored by the National Institute
of Aging and conducted by the University of Michigan. Unlike early work using the
HRS, we use information on the availability of retiree health benefits and pensions in
more than one year; in particular, we examine a pair of two-year retirement transitions,
1992–1994 and 1994–1996, for a sample of men who were employed full-time in 1992,
and allow for changes in retiree health benefits and pensions between 1992 and 1994.
Also, because labor force participation of a spouse may well be important to a man’s
decision to retire, we add variables to the model capturing the employment of each man’s
wife. Finally, we include in the models a control for self-reported health status in order to
obtain additional evidence on the correlation between health and retirement decisions.
The next section describes the extent to which workers are covered by retiree
health benefits, examines trends in that coverage over time, and discusses reasons for the
trends. We also follow a panel of men from the HRS over time, illustrating their
retirement behavior and changes in their health benefit coverage using probability trees.
We then describe the existing literature on health benefit coverage and retirement and
discuss how our analysis contributes to this literature. The following sections describe the
HRS data we use, the retirement models we estimate, and the results of estimation. We
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conclude with a summary of our findings, a discussion of policy implications, and some
suggestions for extending the analysis.

1. Trends and Changes in Retiree Health Coverage
How widespread are retiree health benefits, and how has retiree health coverage
changed over time? Figures 1 through 4 show, for various types of employers, trends in
the percentage who offer retiree health benefits to their workers. The data underlying the
figures come from the Insurance Component of the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey
(MEPS-IC), a survey of employers conducted by the Agency for Health Care Research
and Quality of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Figure 1 shows that
about 20 percent of private employers offered retiree health benefits in 1997, but that
number had fallen to about 13 percent by 2003. Figure 2 shows that large employers are
far more likely than private employers taken as a whole to offer retiree health benefits.
A comparison of Figures 1 and 3 shows that government employers are more
likely to offer retiree health benefits than are private employers. Despite this difference,
offers of retiree health benefits among public employers are also becoming less common
(Figure 3). The trend appears to be confined to local government employers, however, as
the percentage of state government employers that offer retiree health benefits has
increased since 1997 (Figure 4). In 2003, 88 percent or more of state government
employers offered retiree health benefits to their employees.
The above figures pertain to the percentage of employers offering retiree health
benefits. But what percentage of workers is covered by retiree health benefits? Fronstin
(2005) has generated estimates from the Survey of Income and Program Participation
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(SIPP) showing that in 1997 about 50 percent of workers aged 45–64 expected to receive
retiree health benefits upon retirement. This percentage had dropped to roughly 47
percent by 2002. For males, the percentages are slightly higher — 57 percent in 1997,
and 51 percent in 2002. These latter percentages are comparable to those for the HRS
sample we examine in this paper. What is especially interesting about Fronstin’s
estimates, though, is that they far exceed the percentage of retired individuals who report
actually receiving retiree health benefits (Fronstin 2005, pp. 12–15). In 1997, 39 percent
of early retirees and 28 percent of Medicare-eligible retirees reported that they were
receiving retiree health benefits, and these figures had fallen to 28 percent and 26 percent
by 2002. It is reasonable to infer that many workers who expect retiree health benefits do
not receive them.
Fronstin (2001, 2005) and Schieber (2004) attribute the decline in retiree health
coverage largely to Financial Accounting Statement No. 106 (FAS 106) — “Employers’
Accounting for Postretirement Benefits Other Than Pension” — which the Financial
Accounting Standards Board approved in December 1990. FAS 106 requires employers
to treat promised retiree health benefits as financial liabilities in their financial statements
starting with fiscal years after December 15, 1992. The result was reconsideration of
promised retiree health benefits and, in many cases, reduction or elimination of those
promises.
Two more recent factors may also lead employers to curtail early retiree health
benefits. First, a federal court ruling in 2000 held that it is discriminatory for an employer
to provide early retirees more generous health benefits than those provided by the
employer and Medicare (combined) to retirees age 65 and older (U.S. Government
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Accountability Office 2005). As Moon (2005) points out, this ruling and subsequent rules
will make it harder for employers to provide health benefits to early retirees. Second, the
new Medicare prescription drug benefit (Medicare Part D) could induce employers to cut
retiree health benefits on the grounds that the government now offers adequate coverage
at age 65. As Moon (2005) again points out, for employers who are planning to reduce or
eliminate retiree health benefits, the Medicare drug benefit offers an excuse for opting
out.
On the other hand, it is also possible that employers have reduced retiree health
benefits out of a recognition that the baby-boom generation, which makes up a
disproportionate part of the labor force, is aging and may be difficult to replace. The
Economist (2006) has quoted human resource managers who say they are concerned that
“When the baby-boomer generation retires, many companies will find out too late that a
career’s worth of experience has walked out the door, leaving insufficient talent to fill the
void.” It follows that reducing retiree health benefits could be part of a deliberate strategy
to slow the loss of older skilled workers to retirement.
We can gain further insight into changes in retiree health benefit coverage by
tabulating the longitudinal data on workers from the HRS that we analyze more
extensively below. To illustrate how access to retiree health coverage changes over time
for a given sample of workers, we created two probability trees, Figures 5 and 6. Both
figures start with a baseline sample of 3,172 men who were 51–61 years old and
employed full-time 1992. The tree shows that 1,775 of these men (56 percent) had access
to retiree health benefits in 1992, whereas 1,397 (44 percent) did not. Branches of the tree
to the right of the dashed line show how many of these workers remained in the sample,
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had retired, remained employed full-time, or had moved to some other labor force state
(employed part-time, unemployed, partly retired, disabled, or not in the labor force) by
1994 (Figure 5) or 1996 (Figure 6). Continuing to the right, further branches subdivide
retired workers by their health insurance status (employer-provided health insurance,
other health insurance, or uninsured), employed full-time workers by whether they
continued to have access to retiree health benefits (RHB or no RHB), and men in other
labor force states by their health insurance status (insured or uninsured) in 1994 or 1996.
Four main findings emerge from Figures 5 and 6. First, some workers who had
retiree health benefits in 1992 no longer had them in 1994 or 1996. Figure 5 shows that,
of the full-time employed men who were covered by retiree health benefits in 1992, 75
percent (1,338/1,775) were still employed full-time in 1994, and 94 percent of the latter
(1,263/1,338) were still covered by retiree health benefits; however, nearly 6 percent
(75/1,338) of those who remained employed full-time had lost their retiree health
benefits. It follows that 4 percent (75/1,775) of the employed full-time men who were
covered by retiree health benefits in 1992 had lost that coverage by 1994. Figure 6 shows
that by 1996, only 56 percent of full-time covered men (1,001/1,775) remained employed
full-time, and only 58 percent of the latter (580/1,001) were still covered by retiree health
benefits. That is, of the 1,775 employed full-time men who were covered by retiree health
benefits in 1992, 24 percent (421/1,775) had lost retiree health benefit coverage by 1996.
Why did so many workers lose retiree health benefits between 1992 and 1996,
compared with 1992 to 1994? A significant part of the explanation may be that the HRS
question on retiree health benefits differed between 1994 and 1996. The 1994
questionnaire asked HRS respondents whether their employer-provided health insurance
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was “available to people who retire” (question R8 of the 1994 survey). This question is
ambiguous in at least two ways. First, a respondent could interpret it to pertain to either
early retiree benefits or Medicare-eligible retiree benefits. Second, a respondent could
interpret it to apply either to himself or to any other worker. The 1996 questionnaire
asked respondents a more specific question — whether the respondent’s employerprovided health insurance could be continued up to the age of 65 if he or she left the
employer at the time of the interview (questions R34 and R35 of the 1996 survey). This
question is restricted to the availability of early retiree benefits (rather than all retiree
benefits) to the respondent (rather than any worker), so by definition it will elicit fewer
positive responses than the 1994 question. It could well be that retiree health benefit
offers dropped between 1994 and 1996, but the drop is likely to be exaggerated by
comparing Figures 5 and 6.
A second finding from Figures 5 and 6 is that some workers who lacked retiree
benefits in 1992 had gained them by 1994 or 1996. Figure 5 shows that, of the full-time
employed men who lacked retiree health benefits in 1992, 72 percent (1,005/1,397) were
still employed full-time in 1994. Although 89 percent of the latter (889/1,005) still lacked
retiree health benefits, 12 percent (116/1,005) had gained them. So 8 percent (116/1,397)
of the employed full-time men who lacked retiree health benefits in 1992 had gained
coverage by 1994. Figure 6 shows that by 1996, 58 percent of full-time men without
retiree health benefits (809/1,397) remained employed full-time, and 74 percent of the
latter (601/809) still lacked retiree health benefits; however, 26 percent (208/809) had
gained coverage. That is, 15 percent (208/1,397) of the employed full-time men who
lacked retiree health benefits in 1992 had gained coverage by 1996. The finding suggests
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that as older workers increase their job tenures, they thereby become eligible for retiree
health benefits.
Taken together, these first two findings indicate that retiree health coverage of a
given worker does change over time, which suggests in turn the importance of allowing
retiree health coverage to be a time-varying covariate in empirical models of retirement.
Third, some workers who reported having retiree health benefits in 1992, and who
had retired by 1994 or 1996, did not have employer-provided health benefits in
retirement. For example, Figure 6 shows that of the full-time employed men who were
covered by retiree health benefits in 1992, 17 percent (300/1,775) had retired by 1996,
and 82 percent of the latter (245/300) were receiving employer-provided retiree health
benefits; however, 15 percent (45/300) were receiving other health insurance, and 3
percent (10/300) were uninsured. Although the percentage uninsured is quite small, the
the data displayed in Figures 5 and 6 give some longitudinal support to Fronstin’s (2005)
inference that “workers are more likely to expect retiree health benefits than retirees are
to actually have those benefits” (p. 4).
Fourth, workers with retiree health benefits are more likely to retire than those
without. Consider first changes between 1992 and 1994. Whereas 9 percent of workers
with retiree health benefits had retired by 1994 (and more than 90 percent of these were
covered by employer-provided health benefits), less than 5 percent of workers who
lacked retiree health benefits in 1992 had retired by 1994 (and only 38 percent of these
had employer-provided health insurance). Changes between 1992 and 1996 tell a similar
story: 17 percent of workers with retiree health benefits had retired by 1996, but only 10
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percent of workers who lacked retiree health benefits in 1992 had retired by 1996. These
figures give a first hint that retiree health benefits are related to earlier retirement.

2. Retiree Health Benefits and Retirement: Existing Research
Reductions in retiree health benefit coverage could lead government to respond
by expanding Medicare or by regulating retiree benefits. In the absence of a government
response, reductions in the availability of retiree health coverage could lead workers to
change their labor supply behavior and work more or longer, because if they do not, they
or their dependents will not be covered by health insurance.
Much public discussion in recent decades has suggested that a government
response to declining retiree health benefits would be appropriate. Efforts to create
universal health insurance coverage — through a single payer or some other means —
would obviously eliminate the problem implied by declining employer-provided retiree
coverage. Government provision of health insurance would in turn have other
consequences — workers who might otherwise continue working would retire because
they would not need to work in order to maintain health insurance coverage. It follows
that estimates of workers’ labor supply response to retiree health benefits constitute an
important part of the debate over government provision of retiree health benefits.
Much empirical research has investigated the effects of pensions, Social Security,
and assets on the decision to retire, but relatively little research has examined the impact
of health insurance coverage on retirement.2 Previous research has used data from the
HRS, conducted mainly during the 1970s (Rust and Phelan 1997), the Survey of Income
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See Gruber and Madrian (2004) and Madrian (2006) for more complete reviews of the literature and
additional background.
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and Program Participation (Karoly and Rogowski 1994, Madrian 1994), the Current
Population Survey (Gruber and Madrian 1995), and the National Medical Expenditure
Survey (Madrian 1994). These studies uniformly conclude that availability of retiree
health benefits (or continuation coverage in the case of Gruber and Madrian) significantly
increases the probability that an older worker will retire.
Hurd and McGarry (1993), Rogowski and Karoly (2000), and Blau and Gilleskie
(2001) examine the relationship between retirement (or retirement expectations in the
case of Hurd and McGarry) and retiree health benefits using the HRS. The HRS has the
unique advantage of being longitudinal and including questions on both retirement and
the availability of retiree health benefits. As a result, studies based on these data are
among the most convincing in this literature. Hurd and McGarry (1993) examine Wave 1
(1992) of the HRS and find that workers eligible to receive retiree health benefits that are
partly or fully paid by the employer are significantly less likely than other workers to
report that they expect to work past age 62. Rogowski and Karoly (2000) and Blau and
Gilleskie (2001) each take advantage of two waves of the HRS and find that workers with
an offer of retiree health benefits are significantly more likely to retire than workers
without. Rogowski and Karoly find that workers with retiree health benefits in 1992 were
about 11 percentage points more likely to be retired in 1996 than those without. Blau and
Gilleskie examine the transition to retirement between 1992 and 1994 and find that
retiree health benefits increased the probability of retirement by 2 to 6 percentage points,
depending on the extent to which retirees share in the cost of those benefits.
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3. Empirical Model and Data
Both Rogowski and Karoly (2000) and Blau and Gilleskie (2001) leave open three
issues that we explore here. First, they use observations on retiree health benefit
coverage, pension coverage, and other variables in 1992 (Wave 1 of the HRS) to predict
labor force participation 1994 (Wave 2) or 1996 (Wave 3). However, as seen in Figures 5
and 6, retiree health coverage is not constant for each worker but varies over time.
Accordingly, in the estimates below, we allow the availability of retiree health benefits
and pensions to vary from year to year. Second, a small literature has examined the effect
of one spouse’s labor supply behavior on the other’s labor supply (for example,
Buchmueller and Valletta 1999, Wellington and Cobb-Clark 2000, Olson 2000), so we
add to the model variables capturing the employment of each man’s wife. Third, because
health is such an important factor in people’s retirement decisions, we add to the list of
health indicators each individual’s self-reported health status. Our aim in making these
changes is to check whether estimates of the impact of retiree health benefits on
retirement are sensitive to changes in model specification.
We estimate the correlation between retiree health coverage and retirement over
three time periods (1992–1994, 1994–1996, and 1992–1996) for a sample of men in the
HRS born between 1931 and 1941 working full-time (at least 35 hours per week) as of
1992.3 The retirement decision between 1992 and 1994 is conditioned on health benefit
and pension coverage in 1992, whereas the retirement decision between 1994 and 1996 is
conditioned on health benefit and pension coverage in 1994. For comparison, we also
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For the empirical analysis, we started with the RAND HRS Data file, Version F, which is a simplified
longitudinal data set based on the HRS data. See St. Clair et al. (2006).
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estimate a four-year retirement transition, between 1992 and 1996, in which we condition
only on health benefit and pension coverage in 1992.
Specifically, we estimate three probit models of the conditional probability that
individual i (working in 1992 or 1994) will be retired in a subsequent year (1994 or
1996):
Pr(retiredi,1994 = 1 |•) = F[β 0 + β1(rhbi,1992 ) + β 2 ( pensioni,1992 ) + β 3 (healthi,1992 ) +

β 4 (spousei,1992 ) + β 5 (X i,1992 )]

(1)

Pr(retiredi,1996 = 1 |•) = F[β 0 + β1(rhbi,1994 ) + β 2 ( pensioni,1994 ) + β 3 (healthi,1994 ) +

β 4 (spousei,1994 ) + β 5 (X i,1994 )]

(2)

Pr(retiredi,1996 = 1 |•) = F[β 0 + β1(rhbi,1992 ) + β 2 ( pensioni,1992 ) + β 3 (healthi,1992 ) +

β 4 (spousei,1992 ) + β 5 (X i,1992 )]

(3)

In these probits, rhbit denotes a set of dummies indicating whether worker i was offered
retiree health benefits in year t (either 1992 or 1994), pensionit is a set of indicators of
whether worker i was included in a pension plan (or plans) in year t, healthit is a set of
variables modeling the health of the worker in year t, spouseit is a set of variables
indicating whether the worker was married and whether his spouse was working in year t,
and Xit is set of demographic variables. We specify these retirement equations as probits
(F denotes the standard normal cumulative density), but linear probability models would
serve just as well.
The sample starts with the 3,172 men aged 51–61 and employed full-time in 1992
(Wave 1) from the HRS. Over the subsequent four years, some men left the study (due to
death or for other reasons), some retired, others continued to work full-time, and still
others moved to part-time work, unemployment, partial retirement, disability, or left the
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labor force (the “other” category). Figure 7 illustrates these transitions. In 1994, 307 men
left the study, so 2,865 men remained for estimating equation 1. Of these, 226 (8 percent)
had retired by 1994. Between 1994 and 1996 another 183 left the sample, so 2,146 men
remained to estimate equation 2. Of these, 228 (11 percent) had retired by 1996. The
four-year retirement transition modeled by equation 3 is not shown in Figure 7, but
between 1992 and 1996, a net total of 446 men left the study, so 2,726 remain to
contribute to the estimation of equation 3. Of these, 449 (16 percent) had retired by 1996.
Table 1 displays sample means of the independent variables included in the
models. The first column gives means of the “starting sample” — that is, the 3,172 men
in the HRS aged 51–61 who were employed full-time in 1992. The second and third
columns show sample means of the “transition samples” — that is, the samples used to
estimate equations 1 and 2. Comparison of the columns suggests that attrition results in
samples of men who are less likely to have health insurance, less likely to be covered by
a pension, and less likely to be married. Although the attrition does appear to be
nonrandom, it does not appear severe enough to make attrition bias a serious concern.
We model coverage by retiree health benefits (rhbit) in year t using a set of four
mutually exclusive dummy variables:
•

a dummy equal to 1 if the worker had employer-provided health insurance (EHI)
but no offer of retiree health benefits4 (this is the reference category)

•

a dummy equal to 1 if the worker had EHI and would receive health benefits if he
retired

4

As discussed earlier, the 1992 and 1994 question reads, “Is the health insurance plan [that currently covers
you] available to people who retire?” The 1996 and later waves of the HRS ask explicitly whether the
respondent’s health benefit plan would cover him if he retired before age 65.

13

•

a dummy equal to 1 if the worker had no EHI but was covered by some other type
of health insurance

•

a dummy equal to 1 if the worker had no health insurance coverage.

As mentioned earlier, Fronstin (2005) found that roughly 57 percent of men aged 45–64
reported being covered by retiree health benefits in the 1997 SIPP, so the percentages of
workers covered by retiree health benefits in the HRS samples we are using (between 56
and 60 percent) seem reasonable. Note that the percentages are somewhat higher for the
1992–1994 and 1994–1996 subsamples than for the starting sample.
A second set of dummies (pensionit, again mutually exclusive) models whether
the worker was included in a pension plan or tax-deferred savings plan through his work
in year t:
•

a dummy equal to 1 if the worker was not included in any pension plan or didn’t
know whether he was included (the reference category)

•

a dummy equal to 1 if the worker was included in one or more defined
contribution pension plans (but not included in any defined benefit plans)

•

a dummy equal to 1 if the worker was included in one or more defined benefit
pension plans (but no defined contribution plans)

•

a dummy equal to 1 if the worker was included in both a defined contribution and
a defined benefit pension plan

•

a dummy equal to 1 if the worker said he was included in a pension plan but
didn’t know the type.

Nearly two-fifths of this sample were not covered by any employer-sponsored pension
plan in 1992, typical of the population of working men in 1992.
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Rogowski and Karoly (2000) included two variables to capture each worker’s
health status (healthit) in year t. The first is body mass index (BMI) in year t —weight in
kilograms divided by height in meters squared — which has come to be widely used in
the development literature as a measure of maximum physical capacity. The second is a
dummy equal to 1 for workers who report having two or more chronic health conditions
in year t, such as high blood pressure, diabetes, cancer, chronic lung disease, heart
disease, stroke, or arthritis. The latter is only a rough indicator of a respondent’s health,
in part because it does not distinguish more serious from less serious conditions;
however, limitations of the HRS make it difficult to construct a more telling health
indicator based on a respondent’s report of specific illnesses. Accordingly, we add to the
model a dummy variable equal to 1 for respondents who report being in fair or poor
health in year t.
Because the labor force status of a spouse is likely to be important to a man’s
decision to retire, we add to the model a set of dummies capturing the employment status
of each man’s wife in year t:
•

a dummy equal to 1 if the worker was not married (the reference category)

•

a dummy equal to 1 if the worker was married to a woman working full-time

•

a dummy equal to 1 if the worker was married to a woman working part-time

•

a dummy equal to 1 if the worker was married to a woman who does not work (is
unemployed, partly retired, retired, disabled, or not in the labor force).

Because labor supply decisions by couples are likely to be joint, we are concerned that
this set of indicators is endogenous. This is a difficult issue, and the literature on health
insurance and labor supply (cited above) has not addressed it. We include these variables
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to see whether estimates of the impact of retiree health benefits are sensitive to their
inclusion or exclusion, and leave the endogeneity of spousal labor supply to future work.
The demographic controls included in the model (Xit) are age in 1992, an indicator
equal to 1 for nonwhites, and years of schooling. Like Rogowski and Karoly (2000), we
also include a variable indicating the length of time between wave interviews because
that time varies across respondents.

4. Empirical Findings
Table 2 displays estimates of the probit models described above, with one panel
for each model. Each panel gives probit βs, P-values, marginal effects, and marginal
effects relative to the base probability of retirement. (Each marginal effect is the expected
percentage point change in retirement probability from a one-unit change in the
independent variable at the sample mean.)
The key variable in each model is the indicator of employer-provided health
insurance with retiree health benefit coverage (“has EHI and RHB”). The relationship
between retiree health benefits and retirement is strong and statistically significant in
each model. A worker with retiree health benefits in 1992 was 4 percentage points more
likely to be retired in 1994 than was a comparable worker who had employer-provided
health benefits but no retiree health benefits (1992–1994 model). This is a 55 percent
increase in the baseline probability of retirement between 1992 and 1994 of 8 percent.
Also, a worker with retiree health benefits in 1994 was 3 percentage points more likely to
be retired in 1996 than a comparable worker who had no retiree health benefits (1994–
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1996 model) — a 29 percent increase in the baseline retirement probability between 1994
and 1996.
It follows that the relationship between retiree health benefits and retirement was
stronger between 1992 and 1994 than between 1994 and 1996. This is a key finding.
During 1992–1994, the cohort we are analyzing was younger than between 1994–1996.
The stronger relationship between retiree health benefit offers and retirement during
1992–1994 than during 1994–1996 suggests that workers with retiree health benefits tend
to take advantage of those benefits when they are relatively young. This makes sense
because retiree health benefits are more valuable to a worker at age 55 than at age 65 —
the younger worker receives the benefit over more years. To a worker eligible for retiree
health benefits, each year of delayed retirement represents a year of lost benefits. As a
result, we would expect the impact of retiree health benefits on retirement to fall as
workers approach age 65. An important implication is that retiree health benefits are
likely to be expensive precisely because they are more likely to be accepted by workers
who are younger and further from Medicare eligibility. It is hardly surprising, then, that
employers have been trimming their offers of retiree health benefits.
The 1994–1996 model differs from earlier retiree health benefit models estimated
with the HRS because it updates the observations of retiree health benefits and other
independent variables. For comparison, the 1992–1996 model estimates the probability of
retirement in 1996 using only explanatory variables from 1992. That model suggests that
a worker with retiree health benefits in 1992 was 7 percentage points more likely to be
retired in 1996 than a comparable worker without retiree health benefits (1992–1996
model) — a 41 percent increase in the baseline retirement probability between 1992 and
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1996 (16 percent). Although the finding is consistent with the findings from the separate
1992–1994 and 1994–1996 models, it masks the main finding from the separate models
— that the relationship between retiree health benefits and retirement was stronger in the
1992–1994 transition — when the workers in the sample were younger — than in the
1994–1996 transition.
Rogowski and Karoly (2000) estimate a model similar to Table 2’s 1992–1996
model and find a marginal effect of retiree coverage of 11 percentage points —
representing a 68 percent increase in their baseline probability of retirement —
substantially larger than our estimate. Why the difference? We believe the main factor is
that Rogowski and Karoly used the alpha release of the HRS Wave 3 data, whereas we
use the final release of the Wave 3 data as further cleaned by RAND. We end up with a
larger sample than theirs (2,726 vs. 2,638), more retirees (449 vs. 422), and a slightly
higher baseline retirement probability (16.5 percent vs. 16.0 percent) over the four years.
A related point is that Rogowski and Karoly’s coding of the retiree health benefit and
pension indicators may differ from ours (which is based on RAND’s coding in the RAND
HRS data). Because Rogowski and Karoly do not report sample descriptive statistics, it is
difficult to know how our sorting of workers into different retiree health benefit and
pension categories differs from theirs.5

5

Two obvious differences between Rogowski and Karoly’s specification and ours do not seem to underlie
the difference in estimated impact of retiree health benefits. First, Rogowski and Karoly included a dummy
variable indicating whether a worker was married, whereas we include a set of indicators of the
employment status of each worker’s spouse. However, we have estimated the model with a dummy
variable for married replacing the spouse employment status indicators, and the results (not reported) are
essentially similar. Second, Rogowski and Karoly controlled for the cost sharing associated with retiree
health benefits, whereas we have not. We omit cost sharing because HRS data on cost sharing are omitted
from the RAND HRS data file we are using. However, in a draft of this paper, we used the original HRS
data, included cost-sharing indicators, and like Rogowski and Karoly, found them to have little impact on
retirement probabilities. The finding is surprising in light of other findings on the relationship between
health insurance costs and decisions to retire (Johnson, Davidoff, and Perese 2003).
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Table 2 also suggests that workers covered by a defined benefit pension in 1992
were 5 percentage points more likely to be retired in 1994 than those with no pension.
Workers with both defined benefit and defined contribution pensions in 1992 were 4
percentage points more likely to be retired in 1994 than those without. These represent
increases of 58 percent and 47 percent in the baseline probability of retirement between
1992 and 1994. The effects of pension coverage in 1994 on the probability of being
retired in 1996 are even stronger, which suggests that this cohort of workers became
more likely to accept a defined benefits pension as it aged. In striking contrast, workers
covered by defined contribution pensions were no more likely to retire than were those
with no pension. These findings make sense because defined benefit pensions tend to be
structured so as to induce workers to retire between ages 62 and 65, whereas defined
contribution pensions do not create strong retirement incentives (Lazear 1998, Chapter
15). Because the cohort of men we are analyzing was 51 to 61 in 1992, it makes sense
that the impact of a defined benefit pension on retirement would increase in later years
(that is, as the cohort aged and the bulk of the cohort drew closer to age 62).
The models also include a measure of self-reported fair or poor health (“reports
fair or poor health”), in addition to the body mass index and chronic conditions health
indicators included by Rogowski and Karoly (2000). Fair or poor health is statistically
significant in all three models — men who report fair or poor health are between 3 and 7
percentage points more likely to be retired two to four years in the future than men who
do not report fair or poor health. Body mass index is not significant in any of the models,
and the indicator of multiple chronic conditions is significant only in the 1992-1994
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model. (The latter suggests that having two or more chronic conditions in 1992 leads to a
30 percent increase in the baseline probability of retirement in 1994.)
The relationship between spousal labor supply and retirement is quite strong and
suggests the importance of including spousal labor supply variables in retirement models.
Men who had a full-time or part-time working wife in 1992 were 5 percentage points less
likely to be retired in 1994 than were men who were not married. This represents a 60
percent drop in the baseline probability of retirement. The relationship between marriage
to a full-time working spouse and retirement is smaller but still statistically significant for
the 1994-1996 retirement transition. (The relationship between marriage to a part-time
working spouse and retirement is insignificant for 1994-1996.) The findings are
consistent with the idea that couples make decisions about retirement jointly — men and
women with working spouses try to time retirement so as to retire at the same time as
their spouse (Hamermesh 2002).
An important caveat applies to all the above estimates — they should not be
interpreted causally. Although the findings do suggest that retiree health benefits cause
earlier retirement, as we would expect, it is likely that workers who would like to retire
before age 65 choose (or self-select into) jobs that offer retiree health benefits. If so, this
self selection would lead to upward-biased estimates of the causal effect of retiree health
benefits on retirement — workers who are covered by retiree health benefits would have
retired somewhat earlier even if they were not eligible for those benefits. Without further
efforts to identify the true relationship between retiree health benefits and retirement, we
cannot say anything about the size of this bias, but the issue is ripe for future research.
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5. Summary, Implications, and Extensions
Paul Fronstin (2001, 2005) has shown clearly that during the last decade, fewer
employers have offered retiree health benefits, and fewer workers have been covered by
such benefits. Because early retiree health benefits provide a bridge to Medicare for
dislocated workers in their 50s and early 60s, the decline of retiree health benefits leaves
an increasing number of older workers vulnerable to loss of health insurance if they lose
their job. However, past evidence, which we reconfirm here, suggests that retiree health
benefits also induce workers to retire earlier than they would otherwise. Intentionally or
not, retiree health benefits draw experienced and productive workers out of the labor
force.
In this paper, we have used data from the Health and Retirement Study to extend
past work on retiree health benefits in three main ways. First, we develop a descriptive
analysis of retiree health benefit coverage that compares the coverage of workers in 1992
with their coverage two and four years later. The analysis, summarized in two probability
trees (Figures 5 and 6) shows the following:
•

Of the full-time employed workers who had retiree health benefits in 1992, 4
percent had lost those benefits by 1992, and 24 percent had lost them by 1996.

•

Of the full-time employed workers who lacked retiree health benefits in 1992, 8
percent had gained them by 1994, and 15 percent had gained them by 1996.

•

It follows that retiree health coverage of a given worker changes over time, so it
may be important to account for such changes in formulating empirical models of
retirement.
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•

Some full-time employed workers who thought they had retiree health benefits in
1992, and who had retired by 1994 or 1996, did not have employer-provided
health benefits in retirement. Of the full-time employed men who were covered
by retiree health benefits in 1992 and had retired by 1994, 4 percent were
uninsured, and 5 percent were covered by health insurance other than employerprovided insurance.

The analysis is limited by changes in key survey questions between the 1994 and 1996
waves of the HRS, and we believe that further work with post-1996 HRS waves would be
useful.
Second, in modeling the relationship between retiree health benefits and
retirement, we have analyzed two separate two-year transitions in which the explanatory
variables are updated for the second transition. The approach is a simplified survival
analysis or event history analysis with time-varying covariates, and it allows us to
observe different impacts of retiree health benefits on retirement as the cohort of workers
ages. It contrasts with the approach taken in earlier work, where a single two- or fouryear transition is analyzed. The main findings can be summarized simply:
•

For the 1992–1994 transition, workers with retiree health benefits were 4
percentage points more likely to retire than those without — a 55 percent increase
in the retirement probability.

•

For the 1994–1996 transition, workers with retiree health benefits were 3
percentage points more likely to retire than those without — a 29 percent increase
in the retirement probability.
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We infer that this cohort of workers was most likely to accept retiree health benefits
when they were relatively young, then grew less likely to do so as they aged. The
implications are twofold. From a modeling perspective, the findings suggest the
importance of examining repeated transitions and accounting for changes over time in the
explanatory variables. From a policy perspective, the findings are important because they
suggest that workers who are eligible for retiree health benefits tend to take advantage of
them when they are young. This makes sense because retiree health benefits accepted
when a worker is younger yield a benefit for longer and hence are more valuable. The
implication, though, is that retiree health benefits represent an expensive benefit that
tends to induce experienced workers with several remaining productive years to retire.
Policies that create additional retiree health coverage need to account for the reduction in
labor supply that may be an unintended consequence of such policies.
Third, we have attempted to improve on the previous literature by including the
employment status of each worker’s spouse in the retirement models. The findings
suggest strongly that men with a full-time working spouse are less likely to retire than
men who are not married. This suggests that husbands and wives view each others’
leisure time as complementary; hence, couples time their retirements to coincide.
Including spouse’s employment status does not seem to appreciably change the estimated
relationship between retiree health benefits and retirement (see note 5 above).
At least three extensions of the work presented here would be useful. First, it
would clearly be interesting to examine additional two-year retirement transitions by
adding more recent HRS waves to the analysis. Second, it may well be possible to do a
better job of controlling for the health of the workers in the sample by including different
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health indicators from the HRS that we have not exploited. Third, in recent years the
HRS has added cohorts of “War Babies” (born between 1942 and 1947), and of “Early
Baby Boomers” (born between 1948 and 1953). Examining the behavior of these younger
cohorts and comparing it with the behavior of the original HRS sample could have
important implications for public policy. We hope to pursue these extensions in future
work.
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Figure 1
Percentage of Private-Sector Establishments Offering Health Insurance to
Retirees, 1997–2003
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Figure 2
Percentage of Private-Sector Establishments with >1,000 Employees Offering
Health Insurance to Retirees, 1997–2003
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Figure 3
Percentage of Public-Sector Establishments Offering Health Insurance to
Retirees, 1997–2003
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Figure 4
Percentage of State Government Establishments Offering Health Insurance to
Retirees, 1997–2003
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Figure 5
Transitions of employed full-time workers ages 51–61 with and without retiree
health benefits, 1992–1994
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Figure 6
Transitions of employed full-time workers aged 51–61 with and without retiree
health benefits, 1992–1996
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Notes for Figures 5 and 6:
Key to abbreviations:
RHB — covered by retiree health benefits
EFT — employed full-time
NLF — not in the labor force
EPHI — covered by employer-provided health insurance
other HI — covered by health insurance other than EPHI
Note: Each cell shows the individual raw count, the probability of being in a
branch conditional on being in the previous branch (in parentheses), and the
unconditional probability of being in that branch [in square brackets].
Source: Authors’ tabulations of Health and Retirement Study data. See text for
discussion.
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Figure 7
HRS analysis samples illustrated
1992

1994

1996

307

attrition

attrition
EFT

2,329

183
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retired

3,172
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228
other

retired

226

226
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1994-96
analysis sample
N = 2,146
310
1992-94
analysis sample
N = 2,865

Notes:
EFT refers to employed full-time workers.
“Attrition” includes those who were not interviewed or died.
“Other” includes part-time, unemployed, disabled, and not in the labor force.
Source: Authors’ tabulations of Health and Retirement Study data. See text for
discussion.
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Table 1
Summary statistics of samples used in estimation (sample proportions except where noted)

Variable

Starting sample:
(FT employed males
in 1992)

1992–1994
1994–1996
transition sub-sample transition sub-sample
(1992 values)
(1994 values)

Retiree health benefits (RHB)
has employer-provided health
insurance (EHI) but no RHB
(ref)
has EHI and RHB
no EHI but has other coverage
no health insurance

0.24
0.56
0.08
0.12

0.24
0.57
0.08
0.11

0.25
0.60
0.07
0.08

Pension
none or unknown (ref)
has defined contribution
has defined benefit
has both
has but type unknown

0.39
0.18
0.25
0.17
0.01

0.38
0.18
0.25
0.18
0.01

0.34
0.20
0.33
0.12
0.01

Health status indicators
body mass index
multiple chronic conditions
reports fair or poor health

27
0.20
0.12

27
0.20
0.12

27
0.23
0.12

Spousal labor supply
not married (ref)
married, spouse works FT
married, spouse works PT
married, spouse not working

0.16
0.38
0.15
0.31

0.15
0.39
0.15
0.31

0.13
0.38
0.16
0.33

Age at time of 1992 interview
Nonwhite
Years of schooling
Months between interviews

55.7
0.16
13
N/A

55.7
0.15
13
22

55.4
0.14
13
24

Sample size

3,172

2,865

2,146

Notes: The starting sample includes employed full-time men ages 51 to 61 in 1992. The transition
subsamples drop workers who had left the survey by 1994 or 1996. See Figure 7.
Source: Authors’ tabulations of Health and Retirement Study data. See text for discussion.
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Table 2
Probit estimates of retirement probability between 1992-1994, 1994-1996, and 1992-1996, full-time older male workers in the HRS
(probit betas, with P-values and marginal effects)
1992–1994
Independent
Marginal M.E./base
Variable
(%)
Probit β P-value effect (%)
Retiree health benefits(RHB)
[ref: has employerprovided health insurance
(EHI) but no RHB]
has EHl and RHB
0.39
0.00
4
55
no EHI but has other
0.38
0.02
6
70
coverage
no health insurance
0.19
0.24
2
31
Pension
(ref: none or unknown)
has defined contribution
has defined benefit
has both
has but type unknown

1994–1996
Marginal M.E./base
(%)
Probit β P-value effect (%)

Probit β

1992–1996
Marginal M.E./base
P-value effect (%)
(%)

0.24

0.01

3

29

0.33

0.00

7

41

0.16

0.40

2

22

0.23

0.12

5

32

-0.18

0.39

-2

-20

0.11

0.43

2

14

0.02
0.35
0.28
-0.15

0.86
0.00
0.02
0.75

0
5
4
-2

3
58
47
-19

0.06
0.68
0.47
0.70

0.64
0.00
0.00
0.10

1
11
8
15

8
101
76
139

0.16
0.48
0.52
0.71

0.12
0.00
0.00
0.02

3
11
13
20

21
68
78
124

0.01
0.19
0.20

0.11
0.03
0.07

0
2
3

2
30
33

0.01
-0.02
0.39

0.25
0.85
0.00

0
0
7

1
-2
61

0.01
0.11
0.31

0.17
0.16
0.00

0
2
7

1
14
45

Spousal labor supply
(ref: not married)
married, spouse works FT
-0.44
married, spouse works PT
-0.56
married, spouse not working -0.32

0.00
0.00
0.00

-5
-5
-3

-60
-60
-42

-0.29
-0.17
-0.08

0.03
0.26
0.54

-4
-2
-1

-34
-19
-9

-0.23
-0.19
-0.18

0.02
0.09
0.06

-5
-4
-4

-28
-23
-22

Age in 1992
Nonwhite
Years of schooling
Months between interviews

0.12
-0.07
0.00
0.01

0.00
0.54
0.82
0.44

1
-1
0
0

17
-9
0
2

0.16
-0.07
-0.04
0.01

0.00
0.54
0.00
0.75

2
-1
-1
0

20
-8
-5
1

0.16
-0.05
-0.04
0.00

0.00
0.58
0.00
0.80

3
-1
-1
0

20
-6
-5
0

Intercept

-9.08

0.00

-10.81

0.00

-9.93

0.00

Health status indicators
body mass index
multiple chronic conditions
reports fair or poor health
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Log likelihood
Sample size
Number retired
Percent retired
Left survey (all reasons)

-698
2,865
226
8%
307

-600
2,146
228
11%
183

-1032
2,726
449
16%
446

Notes: Probit estimates from samples of employed full-time men ages 51 to 61 in 1992. See Figure 7 and Table 1 for more on the samples.
Source: Authors’ calculations from Health and Retirement Study data. See text for discussion.
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